Sounding objects by Bullot, Nicolas J. et al.
Sounding objects | Les objets sonores 
 
Nicolas Bullot, Roberto Casati, Jérôme Dokic, Maurizio Giri 
Institut Nicod (Paris) 
CNRS | EHESS | ENS 
ArtCognition Studio 
 
Colloque ‘Design sonore 2004’ http://www.design-sonore.org (IRCAM, SFA) 




- Taxonomy of philosophical theories of Sound: proximal theories; medial theories; distal theories. 
- A distal theory: The Located Event Theory (LET) of sound – Understanding sound and the cognition of 
sounding objects; ontology of sound according to the LET; epistemology of the perception of sound and 
sounding objects; auditory images according to the LET; conceptual revisions entailed by distal theories 
and the LET; replies to objections. 
Philosophical Theories of Sound 
- Why are we proposing a ‘philosophical’ theory of sound? Usefulness of conceptual analysis – vs. 
definition; vs. theoretical characterization. 
- A fruitful way to organize issues and taxonomies about the nature of sound deals with how theories 
conceive of the spatial properties of sounds. 
Proximal theories 
- According to proximal theories, sounds are sensations or qualitative aspects of auditory perception. 
From the point of view of proximal theories, sounds are conceived of as internal events, as mental 
episodes, or proximal stimulations. This may be the mainstream view in psychology. It emphasizes the 
high correlation between felt properties of sounds and properties of perceptual system. 
Medial theories 
- According to medial theories, sounds are conceived of as being located between the sounding objects 
and the hearer. This may be the mainstream view in acoustics: sounds are held to be sound waves. It has 
a high explanatory power due to the high correlation of physical quantities and felt qualities. However, 
the correlation is poor with felt location of sound. 
Distal theories 
- One should consider another candidate for the determination of the nature of sounds, namely distal 
properties, processes or events in the medium inside (or at the surface of) sounding physical objects, or 
in the stuff of the sounding object. Distal views claim they are superior to their non-distal competitors in 
virtue of their better adherence to the spatial structure of auditory content. In point of fact, we do hear 
sounds both as externalized (hence auditory content is at odds with proximal views) and as distally 
located (hence auditory content is at odds with medial views).  
- Sounds are where you hear them. A possible misreading of the phenomenological constraint: “we want 
an account of sounds that is completely true to the phenomenology” – this is a much too strong reading. 
A weaker construal is this: auditory perception has the power to represent sounds; it has the power to 
represent motion; it has the power to represent sounds in motion; hence it should be able to represent 
sounds as moving individuals. But this is not possible according to medial theories (since sound waves 
are not moving individuals). Thus, medial theories are not convincing from the phenomenological 
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A distal theory: The Located Event Theory (LET) of sound 
- According to the LET (Casati and Dokic, 1994, forthcoming; Casati, Dokic, Bullot & Giri, in 
preparation), sounds are located events happening to sounding objects1. Typically, each particular sound 
is a vibratory event/process occurring in the stuff of a resonating material/physical object. 
- Examples of LET classifications on the basis of particular audio recordings: 
- Example A,2 Object-fall in a courtyard, one can perceive the located event of the fall affecting a 
individual sounding object (that has undergone this event) and obtain information about its spatial 
context (reverberations or echoes due to surrounding walls, atmospheric surrounding events, background 
noises). 
- Example B, Footsteps, main sounding object: a person (walking), an intentional agent; type of event: 
footfall, contact at regular intervals between the shoes and the ground surface, walking, heading toward 
something. 
- Example C,3 Drawers, a person is interacting with drawers and objects in them. This person is searching 
for objects in drawers and over a desk (opening drawers and moving sounding objects within them). 
- Example D,4 Grasshoppers, soundscape or landscape at night with grasshoppers or crickets; each insect 
is a particular sounding object. 
- The LET includes an ontological and an epistemological analysis. 
Ontology of sound according to the Located Event Theory 
- According to the ontological analysis of the LET, sounds are dependent individuals: they depend on the 
existence of resonating physical objects (such as speakers, artifacts, animals, plants etc.). Sounds are 
located at their physical source, and may be identical with, or at least supervenient on, vibration 
processes in it. The location of sound is thus parasitic upon the location of the sounding object. Auditory 
perception of sounds requires a medium which transmits information from the vibrating object to the 
ears (air, water); however, the transmitting medium is not essential to the existence of sounds. 
- We see at once the fit of this view with those features of sound which are sources of trouble in the cases 
discussed above. Vibration processes in the sounding object do not move any more than sounds appear 
to move. Like sounds, and unlike acoustic waves in the ambient medium, their intensity can remain the 
same through a period of time. Finally, and most importantly, tuning-forks and other sounding objects 
can be taken as continuing to vibrate irrespective of their being or not being immersed in a medium. We 
do not create sounds by surrounding vibrating objects with a medium – we simply reveal the vibrating 
event they are informing us about. 
- A side-effect of the LET is that it makes plain what category sounds belong to, as opposed to views that 
construe sounds generically as qualities (e.g. as per traditional theories of secondary qualities). Sounds 
are either instantaneous events or temporally extended processes. They start and cease. They are 
intrinsically temporal entities. 
- An interesting consequence of the strong version of LET ontology: sounds may exist in a vacuum (where 
a sounding/resonating object is). This is an apparent violation of the phenomenological constraint. The 
Quick Vacuum Jar Thought Experiment. 
- Example A,5 Tunnel effect with the glass bell-jar experiment: revealing the environmental sounds after 
enclosure of microphone within a glass bell-jar. 
 
                                                 
1 The notion of ‘sounding object’ is a technical term introduced in the framework of the LET. It refers to a particular 
physical object (or resonating object) in which a perceptible vibratory event takes. Its meaning is illustrated in the 
following paragraphs. 
2 Hear at http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/Object-fall_in-courtyard_August-12-2004_32-
44.MP3. 
3 Hear at http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/ijn2_correct_bureau_rob_2.MP3. 
4 Hear at http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/grasshoppers.MP3. 





 ﬁﬀ ﬂﬃ !"#$&%'')( +* 	 -,
Epistemology of the perception and cognition of sounding objects 
- According to the epistemological analysis of the LET, in ordinary crossmodal perceptual experience, 
sounds usually can be directly (1) localized (‘Where?’) and (2) identified (‘What?’). 
- (1) The perceptual localization of sounds; examples of auditory localization without (simple) 
identification of the sounding objects; case of the domination of localization information: 
- Example A,6 Rotating object, A sounding object, which is rotating on a resonating surface, has been 
captured via close-miking recording. Even though the spatial information is very well structured, the 
identification is problematic except perhaps for perceptual experts of the kind of physical object that has 
been used (one bass tabla with goat skin and a thick steel wire). 
- Example B,7 Reverberated frictions, impression of space without simple identification (microphones are 
inside a ruined piano, a rusted cord is rubbed by a metallic chain). 
- (2) The perceptual identification of sounds relies on the perceptual recognition of the type of resonating 
object, the type of occurring event, or the spatio-temporal tracking of particular sounding objects. Sound 
perception contributes to crossmodal spatio-temporal tracking and identification (e.g., Driver & Spence 
2004). 
- Example A, Speaker recognition, recognizing the present speaker via the recognition of his particular 
voice is an ordinary example of identification of an individual sounding object. 
- Example B, Fast proto-identification of voice fragments, serial composition of successive voice samples 
lasting no more than 500 milliseconds each: it should be salient that we can get identifying information 
from all of these tiny successive pieces, even though the obtained information does not guarantee 
identification in the strongest sense, i.e. demonstrative re-identification of a single individual across time 
(Strawson 1959, Evans 1982). 
- Examples C,8 Influence of identifying information on localization (bells), a recording of church bells is 
projected at the ground level; if the sound image of the church bell were mislocated, this might be due to 
the long time perceptual learning of chiming from the top of churches instead of down at the ground 
level. In other terms, the way one perceptually locates these church bell sounds may be biased by your 
background semantic knowledge about the location of ordinary chuch bells. This might illustrate the 
possibility of influencing auditory localization by identifying (semantic) information. (At the very least, 
it is known that localization is influenced by crossmodal interactions, e.g. visual information can 
influence auditory location via crossmodal effects such as the ventriloquist illusion.) 
- Example D, Influence of identifying information on localization (footfalls), similar effects might be 
obtained with the recording of footfalls sounds projected by the ceiling (or eventually previous drawer 
sounds projected toward the ceiling). 
Auditory images according to the LET 
- According to the LET, audio recordings are generating the experience of auditory images (based on the 
emission of the loudspeakers, which are the only actual and accessible sounding objects when hearing 
auditory images). 
- Electroacoustic mixing allows manipulating auditory images, as it has been done for years in the history 
of electroacoustic music, concrete music and acoustic installations. The manipulation of sound images is 
crucial for sound design because it relates to meaningful perception (Dretske 1995), via namely the 
manipulation of accessing and recognitional routines of auditory attention. 
- Mixing audio recordings can lead to the production of ‘physically impossible’ or ‘apparently illusory’ 
auditory images: 
                                                 
6 Hear at http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/TablaLOOP2_circle1_4432.MP3 and http://nicolas-
bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/TBL%20LOOP%201.MP3 . 
7 Hear at http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/Ruind-pia_(Macon-1999)_chain-rub_32-48.MP3 . 
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- Example A,9 This mixing is based on the idea of making ‘intersecting’ at ‘approximately the same 
location’ the sound image of a process of combustion (fire obtained via gaz combustion) and a process 
of water churning (moving a wire in water). 
- Example B,10 This mixing proceeds by superposing four stereophonic bikes images focused on rotating 
wheels (with one stick in their spokes). 
- Example C,11 This mixing proceeds with miscellaneous sounding objects of different kinds. 
Conceptual revisions entailed by distal theories and the LET 
- How much should our conception of sound be revised? 
- A fundamental ambiguity affects the notion of ‘sound-object’. On the one hand, a ‘sound-object’ is 
merely a physical object that produces a sound, a distal sounding object; on the other hand, the ‘sound-
object’ is the sound itself, what I have an auditory experience of. The conceptual shift is quite common 
in ordinary parlance: hearing a car is hearing the sound of the car, and conversely. The LET firmly 
anchors the sound in the resonating object – the sounding object. 
- By ‘object’ in ‘sounding object’ we do mean ‘particular physical body’ that fulfills objecthood criteria 
(such as possessing spatio-temporal continuity and causal powers). We do not mean ‘objets sonores’ in 
Schaeffer’s sense (e.g., Schaeffer 1966, Schaeffer & Reibel 1998[1967]: 52-66). The latter are not 
localized in a physical mind-independent body but (apparently) are narrow intentional contents of 
auditory attention or ‘reduced hearing’ – or sound images. The identity/objectivity criteria of Shaeffer’s 
‘objets sonores’ is more problematic than those of LET’s sounding objects. 
- Potential consequences of reconceptualization: Object Oriented Musical Composition (instead of tone-
oriented or relation-oriented composition) should take into account the perceptual abilities for 
recognizing ordinary sounding objects. Sound designers should develop Object Oriented Auditory 
Interfaces. 
Replies to objections 
- We shall now briefly discuss some interrelated objections to the identification proposed by the Location 
Event Theory. 
- (1) Imprecise location. The first objection concerns sound location. We suggested that sounds are heard 
as located, but it could be maintained that the location is often imprecise or even erroneous, this in turn 
depending on the nature of sounds waves. If a sound wave coming from a sounding object located on my 
right is reflected by a wall on my left, a sound is heard as being located on my left. But we see no 
particular problem in this fact, as in other facts linked to misperception. Seeing an object in the mirror is 
not seeing another, immaterial object located in an immaterial space beyond the mirror-plane. There is 
no such object; we see one and the sole material object, and we locate it incorrectly.  
- Example A,12 Multiple individual grasshoppers: Distinct recordings of clouds of crickets and 
grasshoppers: Apparent objection to the theory: the overall experience is that of an overall and 
surrounding sound (then un-located); reply to the objection: just move and get closer to one particular 
sounding object/individual (cf. phonotaxie); recordings: instance 1 = filtered (no salient individual), 
instance 2: non filtered (salient individual).  
- Example B,13 Located droplets: The same kind of considerations may apply here too, excerpt that rain 
droplets are too small and ephemeral to be tracked individually by human perceptual systems (i.e., 
without prosthetic apparatuses). 
- The temptation of identifying sounds with sound waves can arise because of precisely this fact: that 
sounds can be mislocated. They can be heard as located in a region which is larger than the one occupied 
                                                 
9 Hear at http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/Wet-fire1_ELEMden_v7_3296.MP3 and 
http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/Wet-fire(mousse)1_ELEMden_v7_3296.MP3 . 
10 Hear at http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/bikes_ELMTv7.MP3 . 
11 Hear at http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/Mix-dic_1_ELEMden_v7_3296.MP3 . 
12 Hear at http://nicolas-bullot.org/njbCOLL/SAO/AuditoryQueries/grasshoppers.MP3 . 
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by a sounding object, a region which it is reasonable to take as being occupied by sound waves. But does 
this compel us to accept the identification of sounds with sound waves? By no means. Sound waves are 
responsible for the perceptual difficulty in locating sounds, as mirrors are for the analogous difficulty for 
visible objects. But it is not the case that sound waves are sounds just because of this responsibility. 
Consider the following sophism: x hears something as imperfectly located, therefore x hears something 
which is imperfectly located. This would be an invalid inference from epistemology to ontology. 
- (2) Doppler Effect. The second objection concerns typical acoustic effects, like the Doppler effect, which 
are perfectly accounted for by appeal to medial sound waves. Such explanations of the Doppler effect 
are harmless for our own account. The Doppler effect is dependent on something going on in the 
medium, but this should not make us think that what we hear are sound waves. When we hear sounds as 
undergoing a Doppler effect, we do not hear anything different from a vibration process in a sounding 
object, a process which is heard in a sort of perspectival shortening because the movement of the 
sounding object causes, among other things, the Doppler effect. 
- (3) The causal link. Another objection has it that surely there are sound-waves in the ambient medium, 
otherwise no causal link could be set between the sounding object and our perception of the latter. And 
such sound waves can certainly be measured and physically described. Now we dare not deny that there 
are sound waves in the ambient medium: of course there are, and they are causally responsible for our 
aural perceptions when these are perceptions of anything at all. We just contend that such sound waves 
are not what we hear – in this sense, they are not perceptual deputies, for we do not perceive sounds by 
perceiving them. Consider an analogy. Light is causally responsible for your perception of an object’s 
surface. But this does not make you see the light. Actually, we can see light-emitting sources, but never 
light in itself: in order to be seen, light should have to emit light carrying information about it. 
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